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Constitutional Law - RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT -
TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 AND THE FCC NONDIS- 
CRIMININATION REGULATIONS -King's Garden, Inc. v.  FCC, 498 F.2d 
5 1 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S .  Ct. 309 (1 974). 
King's Garden, Inc. is a religious organization which owns and oper- 
ates two radio stations. A letter of complaint was filed with the Federal 
Communications Commission alleging that King's Garden was violating 
the Commission's nondiscrimination regulations1 by discriminating on 
the basis of religion in choosing employees. In response, King's Garden 
filed a memorandum of law based upon the Civil Rights Act of 1 9642 and 
the free exercise clause of the first amendment, contending that as a re- 
ligious organization engaged in religious activity, it should be exempt 
from the Commission's ban on religious discrimination in employment. 
The Commission rejected this contention3 and ruled that only "those 
persons hired to espouse a particular religious philosophy over the air 
should be exempt from the nondiscrimination r ~ l e s . ' ' ~  Prior to this 
ruling, but subsequent to the filing of the memorandum of law, the Civil 
Rights Act was amended to allow religious organizations to discriminate 
in employment on the basis of religion in all activities, not only in re- 
ligious activities as previously a l l o ~ e d . ~  King's Garden notified the 
Commission of this amendment and requested that the Commission alter 
its holding to conform with the new legislation. The Commission, how- 
ever, reaffirmed its prior r ~ l i n g . ~  The Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia affirmed, holding that the Commission is not required to 
incorporate the 1972 amendment to the Civil Rights Act into its nondis- 
- - 
I47 C.F.R. $5 73.125, 73.301 (1972). Section 73.125 applies to AM broadcasting, and section 
73.301 applies to FM broadcasting. The two sections are identically worded, stating, in part: 
(a) General Policy. Equal opportunity in employment shall be afforded by all licensees or 
permittees of commercially or noncommercially operated standard, FM, television or interna- 
tional broadcast stations (as defined in this part) to all qualified persons, and no person shall be 
discriminated against in employment because of race, color, religion, national origin or sex. 
242 U.S.C. $5 1981 et seq. (1970). The memorandum relied primarily on 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-1 
(1970) which (prior to the 1972 amendment) allowed religious organizations to discriminate 
"with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work con- 
nected with the carrying on by such corporation . . . of its religious activities. . . . " T h e  
memorandum also relied on 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-2 (e) (1970) which permits discrimination in  
employment "on the basis of . . . religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances 
where religion, sex or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise." 
3Trygve J. Anderson, 34 F.C.C.2d 937 (1972), aff'd sub nom. King's Garden, Inc., 38 F.C.C. 
2d 339 (1972), aff'd sub nom. King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 95 S .  Ct. 309 (1974). 
4Zd. at 938. 
5Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-1 (Supp. 11, 1972), amending 
42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-1 (1970). 
6King's Garden, Inc., 38 F.C.C.2d 339 (1972), aff'd sub nom. King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 
498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 309 (1974). 
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crimination regulations, and that the FCC regulations give adequate 
protection to the first amendment freedoms of religious  broadcaster^.^ 
A. The Communications Act of 1934 
Congress created the Federal Communications Commission by the 
Communications Act of 1934.8 This Act gives the Commission the man- 
date to license radio stations "as public convenience, interest, or necessity 
requires,"9 and the authority to " [m] ake such rules and regulations and 
prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as 
may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter. "lo The Com- 
mission wields "expansive powersW1l under this Act, as long as it stays 
within the "vagueish, penumbral bounds expressed by the public inter- 
est. "12 
Pursuant to this authority the Commission in 1968 promulgated regu- 
lations providing that "no person shall be discriminated against in em- 
ployment because of race, color, religion, national origin or sex. "'3 These 
regulations were based both upon the policies expressed by the "public 
interest" mandate of the Communications Act and the "national policy 
against discrimination in employment . . . embodied in Section VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ?'I4 
B. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 
The Civil Rights Act is one of the basic legislative weapons against 
discrimination. Title VII of the Act is specifically directed toward the 
elimination of discrimination in employment, and the legislative history 
behind this title clearly indicates that it establishes the national policy 
against discrimination in employment.l5 
'King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 309 (1974). 
847 U.S.C. $5 151 et seq. (1970). 
9Zd. 8 303 (1970). 
loZd. 5 303(r) (1970). 
"National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,216 (1942). 
12FCC v. RCA Comminications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86,91 (1953). 
1347 C.F.R. $5 73.125, 73.301 (1972). The  text of the regulations is set forth, in part, at note 1 
supra. 
'4Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees to Show Nondiscrimination in Their Employ- 
ment Practices, 13 F.C.C.2d 766,767 (1968). In this memorandum, the Commission announced 
its intent to foster the policies of the Civil Rights Act by promulgating nondiscrimination 
regulations. I t  recognized that the Civil Rights Act provisions were applicable to a significant 
number of broadcast licensees (Id. at 768), and acknowledged that, in upholding its public 
interest mandate, it must consider such policies (Id. at 769). 
15 
The  purpose of this title [title VII Civil Rights Act of 19641 is to eliminate, through the 
utilization of formal and informal remedial procedures, discrimination in employment 
1951 CASE NOTES 197 
The Act originally provided that the ban on religious discrimination 
in employment shall not apply 
to a religious corporation, association, or society with respect to the em- 
ployment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work con- 
nected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, or society of 
its religious activities. l6 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 amended this section, 
inter alia, by striking the word "religious" before "activities. " The legis- 
lative history of the amendment clearly indicates that Congress intended 
the exemption to be broad enough to reach all activities of all religious 
organizations.lT The far-reaching implications of this amendment must 
be examined against the religion clauses of the first amendment. 
C .  The  Religion Clauses of the First Amendment 
1. Free Exercise. The free exercise clause prohibits governmental 
regulation of religious beliefs and practices, and bars governmental inter- 
based on race, color, religion, or national origin. The title a&horizes the establishment of 
a Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and delegates to it the primary 
responsibility for preventing and eliminating unlawful employment practices as defined 
in the title. 
Section 701 (a) sets forth a congressional declaration that all persons within the juris- 
diction of the United States have a right to the opportunity for employment without dis- 
crimination on account of race, color, religion, or national origin. It is also declared to be 
the national policy to protect the right of persons to be free from such discrimination. 
1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 240 1. 
'642 U.S.C. 5 2000e-1 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-1 (Supp. 11, 1972) (emphasis 
added). For a discussion of title VII prior to the 1972 amendment see Note, Title VZZ- 
Religious Discrimination in Employment - Zs "Effect on Individual Religious Belief" 
Discrimination Based on Religion under the Civil Rights Act of l964f 16 WAYNE L. h v .  327 
(1969); Comment, Religious Observance and Discrimination in Employment, 22 SYRACUSE L. 
h v .  1019 (1971). 
"Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., in introducing the amendment, stated that it 
would exempt religious corporations, associations, and societies from the application of 
this act insofar as the right to employ people of any religion they see fit is concerned. . . . 
In other words, this amendment is to take the hands of Caesar off the institutions of God, 
where they have no place to be. 
SUBCOMM. O N LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. O N  LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 9 2 ~  CONG., 2~ 
SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972 1645 
(Comm. Print 1972). 
Similarly, the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Managers at the Conference on the Bill 
states: 
[TI he Senate provision expanded the exemption for religious organizations from cover- 
age under this title with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion 
in all their activities instead of the present limitation to religious activities. 
1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2180. 
See generally G. Sape & T. Hart, Title VIZ Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Oppor- 
tunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. h v .  824 (1972); Note, Civil Rights- Religious Dis- 
crimination in Private Employment Under Title VZZ of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 3 
CUMBER-SAM. L. REV. 497 (1972). 
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ference with the dissemination of religious ideas.lB Numerous special 
privileges and exemptions from state control have been granted to indi- 
viduals and religious organizations under this clause.lg 
In determining whether a government activity or regulation violates 
the free exercise clause, the Supreme Court uses a balancing test. First, 
the Court looks to the nature of the religious interest involved to deter- 
mine whether it is a legitimate belief or practice20 entitled to constitu- 
tional protection.21 Second, it looks to the conflicting state interest in 
regulating the religious belief or practice to determine whether the state 
interest is of sufficient magnitude to override the religious interest.22 
There is a presumption favoring the religious interest, for the Supreme 
Court has said that only those state interests "of the highest order and 
those not otherwise served" will take precedence over religious in- 
terest~.~3 If the state fails to carry its burden of showing an overriding 
state interest, the free exercise claim will prevail. 
2. i3tablishment. The establishment clause insures governmental 
neutrality in religious matters. It is specifically intended to guard against 
the evils of sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of 
the sovereign in religi0n.~4 The Supreme Court has held that a law may 
violate the establishment clause even though it does not promote a state 
religion and does not aid one religion more than an0ther.~5 However, 
the Court has long recognized that the establishment clause does not de- 
'8Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971). See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 
(1963); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 
573 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). 
lgSee Shetreet, Exemptions and Privileges on Grounds of Religion and Conscience, 62 
K Y .  L. J. 377 (1973); Pfeffer, T h e  Supremacy of Free Exercise, 61 GEO. L. J. 1115 (1973); Walz 
v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (property tax exemption); United States v. Seeger, 
380 U.S. 163 (1965) (draft exemption); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
(1 943) (flag salute). 
20The traditional distinction between belief and practice established by such cases as 
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) and followed by such cases as Braunfeld v. 
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), has not been adhered to by such recent cases as Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See note 23 infra. Also, the Supreme Court has indicated that the 
protections of the free exercise clause extend beyond traditional concepts of religion. United 
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
21Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,215-16 (1972). 
22Zd. at 214-15. 
23Zd. at 215. The  facts in Yoder provide a good illustration of the balancing test employed 
under the free exercise clause. There a state requirement that all persons attend school 
until the age of 16 years conflicted with the Amish belief that education beyond the eighth 
grade was improper and would undermine their religious organization. The  Court con- 
sidered the relative importance of the state's interest in requiring school attendance in rela- 
tion to the importance of the asserted religious claims, and found the state interests insufficient 
to outweigh the presumption favoring free exercise. 
%ee Committee for Public Educ. 8c Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); 
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 95 (1968); 
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
25Committee for Public Edcc. 8c Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973). 
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mand complete separation between church and state;" numerous types 
of government involvement with religion have been held constitution- 
al.27 A three-part test has evolved for determining whether a law is valid 
under the establishment clause. First, the law must reflect a clearly secu- 
lar legislative purpose; second, the law must have a primary effect that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion; and third, it must avoid excessive 
government entanglement with religion.28 
The instant case focused on the status of religious discrimination in 
employment under the Communications Act, the Civil Rights Act, and 
the religion clauses of the first amendment. 
In affirming the Federal Communications Commission's ruling, the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the 1972 amend- 
ment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not preempt the Commission's 
nondiscrimination regulations, and that the Commission's regulation 
adequately protected the constitutional rights of religious broadca~ters.~g 
The court, relying heavily on the fact that the legislative history of the 
1972 amendment made no explicit reference to the FCC, inferred that 
Congress silently approved the nondiscrimination regulations which 
were in effect at the time of the amendment's enactment.30 The court 
acknowledged that the Commission has a duty to examine new legislation 
to determine its relevance to the broadcasting industry,3l and recognized 
that the literal language of the amendment is broad enough to cover re- 
ligious broadcasters such as King's Garden.32 But it emphasized that the 
amendment was debated in the context of religious educational institu- 
tions, with few references to its broader application, and concluded that 
the FCC was justified in finding that the amendment was not intended to 
cover such regulated, quasi-public institutions as radio stations.33 
The court also reasoned that no religious organization has a constitu- 
tional right to hold a broadcast license, and therefore restrictions upon 
the use of a license should not be viewed as interference with free exer- 
~ i s e . 3 ~  The court described a broadcast license as a public privilege to use 
part of the public domain. The scarcity of this broadcast privilege, 
26Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
27See note 19 supra. 
2*Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 41 3 U.S. 756, 773 (1973) (and 
cases cited therein). 
29498 F.2d 51,53-54 (1974). 
3OZd. at 53. 
3lZd. at 58. 
32Zd. 
33Zd. at 54,58-59. 
34Zd. at 60. 
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coupled with the fact that the privilege is voluntarily assumed by the 
licensee, influenced the court to hold that the licensee must adhere to the 
regulations established by the FCC without complaint regarding first 
amendment freedoms.35 
Nevertheless, the court did recognize that a religious broadcaster such 
as King's Garden does have a constitutional right to express its religious 
beliefs and to give a sectarian tone to its programming.36 It also acknow- 
ledged that the Commission's regulations are susceptible to unconstitu- 
tional abuse if the FCC were to forbid religious discrimination in pro- 
gramming which constituted a significant expression of the religious or- 
ganization's sectarian viewpoint.a7 But the court did not resolve this 
problem, since the attack was to the facial validity of the FCC regula- 
tions, not to their application. 
Because the court held the 1972 amendment was inapplicable to the 
Commission's regulations, it did not need to reach the issue of the amend- 
ment's constitutionality. Yet, a large part of the opinion is dicta devoted 
to this issue, and the court concluded that the amendment contravenes 
the establishment clause and is much broader than necessary to protect 
free exer~ise.3~ The court did recognize that under the free exercise 
clause some religious discrimination in employment may be allowed, and 
conceded "that Congress may, without violating the Establishment 
Clause, expand a religious exemption somewhat beyond the minimal 
SgArguably, the exemption granted under the 1972 amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 is merely a necessary extension of the free exercise clause insuring that religious expres. 
sion is not chilled by governmental intrusion into the internal affairs of religious organizations, 
However, most free exercise cases involve religious practices which are more fundamental to 
religious doctrine than the right to discriminate in employment. See, e.g., Wisconsin v, 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Even assuming that there is a bona fide free exercise interest in 
being allowed to discriminate in employment, the 1972 amendment seems broader than neces- 
sary. As the court of appeals points out, the free exercise clause was not intended to permit 
religious organizations to discriminate in staffing "a trucking firm, a chain of motels, a race 
track, a telephone company, a railroad, a fried chicken franchise, or a professional football 
team," yet under the 1972 amendment such discrimination would be condoned. King's 
Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51,54 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
The  court's more compelling argument is that the amendment violates the establishment 
clause. The amendment does not have a clearly secular legislative purpose, though it does 
facilitate separation between church and state. Since the amendment allows religious organi- 
zations to discriminate in employment, it seems that the primary effect is the advancement of 
religious organizations over nonreligious organizations. The only one of the three traditional 
criteria for validity under the establishment clause with which the amendment clearly complies 
is that it avoids excessive government entanglement with religion. Nevertheless, the amend- 
ment seems to grant no special privileges to religious organizations more violative of the estab- 
lishment clause than those approved in such cases as Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), 
and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), where the secular legislative purpose was equally 
absent and the primary effect was equally religious. 
Here it is intended only to pose the question of the constitutionality of the 1972 amend- 
ment, for the court did not find it necessary to resolve this issue. But even assuming, 
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boundaries created by the several First Amendment liberties. '99 Never- 
theless, the court firmly concluded that there is "no precedent for the un- 
limited 1972 exemption. "40 
A. The FCC Regulations and the Civil Rights Act 
King's Garden initially raises two related questions. First, do the FCC 
nondiscrimination regulations conflict with the amended Civil Rights 
Act? Second, if such conflict does exist, should the statute take prece- 
dence over the regulations? 
1. The FCC regulations conflict with the Civil Rights Act. The 
Commission's nondiscrimination regulations clearly contradict the equal 
employment provisions of the Civil Rights Act as amended by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. The original Civil Rights Act 
provision on religious discrimination in employment was similar to the 
current FCC regulations, allowing discrimination only in the religious 
activities of religious organizations. However, the 1 972 amendment al- 
tered that national policy by explicitly stating that religious organizations 
are to be exempt from the ban on religious discrimination in all activi- 
ties.4l 
No conflict would exist if the term "activities," as used in the Civil 
Rights Act, were narrowly construed so as not to include such commer- 
cial ventures as owning radio stations. But, as the court of appeals recog- 
nized, such a strained construction would avert the clear meaning of the 
statute." The legislative history of the amendment clearly indicates that 
the exemption is to apply to all activities of religious  organization^.^^ 
Thus, the court must concede, as it did, that " [t] he literal terms of the 
exemption do cover sectarian radio . . . ."44 
The court, however, reasoned that no conflict exists between the regu- 
lations and the Civil Rights Act because Congress did not indicate that 
the 1972 amendment should apply to the FCC's regulation of "quasi- 
argucndo, that the 1972 amendment is unconstitutional, the FCC should consider itself bound 
by it until it is struck down by a court of competent jurisdiction. See text accompanying note 
62 infra. Furthermore, even if the amendment were struck down, the FCC nondiscrimination 
regulations themselves are violative of the free exercise clause. See text accompanying notes 
64-93 infra. 
39498 F.2d at 56. 
401d. at 61. Chief Judge Bazelon filed a short concurring opinion, stating that although the 
FCC xnay not contradict a direct congressional enactment, he would hold the 1972 amend- 
ment to the Civil Rights Act unconstitutional, and therefore not binding on the FCC. 
41See text accompanying notes 16-17 supra. 
42498 F.2d at 54 n. 7, 58. 
43See notes 16-17 and accompanying text supra. 
44498 F.2d at 58 (footnote omitted). 
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public" radio stations.45 This conclusion is incorrect since a major pur- 
pose of the 1972 amendment was to make the provisions of the Civil 
Rights Act applicable to governmental agencies and other public 
entities.46 Furthermore, the court recognized that the Commission has a 
duty to examine new legislation and to conform FCC policies to relevant 
congressional policies.47 It cited with approval the case of McClean 
Truck ing  Co. v.  United States4* where the Supreme Court held that the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, in approving a merger of motor car- 
riers, could not ignore the national policies contained in the antitrust 
laws, even though, once having been approved by the ICC, the merger 
was exempt from the antitrust laws. The Supreme Court declared that 
an administrative agency cannot ignore legislative policies that conflict 
with its own actions, but must incorporate them into the agency's admin- 
istrative acti0n.~9 The Court did say that the adjustments which an 
agency must make will vary according to the extent to which Congress 
indicates a desire to have those policies implemented by the agency.50 
Congress is not required, however, under the McClean Trucking doc- 
trine, to specifically enumerate all agencies which should apply a national 
policy like the Civil Rights Act. The Commission should have recog- 
nized from the clear wording and legislative history of the 1972 amend- 
ment that all religious organizations, including religious broadcasters 
under FCC jurisdiction, were intended objects of the legislation. 
Furthermore, the fact that the amendment was broadening the coverage 
of the Civil Rights Act to include public entities should have been signal 
enough that the law was relevant to the FCC's mandate and that the non- 
discrimination regulations should be altered to conform to this new 
national policy. 
2.  Administrative agencies are bound by Congressional policies. It 
is clear that a real conflict exists between the regulations and the statute, 
and under a well-accepted principle of statutory interpretation the statute 
451d. at 53. 
4642 U.S.C. 5 2000e (Supp. 11, 1972). Clearly the amendment was intended to broaden the 
Civil Rights Act to reach public entities and governmental agencies as well as private activities. 
The  legislative history states: 
The  bill amends section 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (section 2 of the bill) to in- 
clude State and local governments, governmental agencies and political subdivisions with- 
in the definition ofan "employer" under Title VII. 
. . .  
The  bill adds a new section 717 (section 11 of the bill) which . . . gives the Equal Employ- 
ment Opportunity Commission the authority to enforce the obligations of equal employ- 
ment opportunity in Federal employment. 
1972 U.S. CODE CONG. 1L AD. NEWS 2152,2155. 
47498 F. 2d at 58. 
48321 U.S. 67 (1944), appearing at 498 F. 2d at 58. 
491d. at 80. 
50~d .  
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must govern the  regulation^.^^ This basic principle is incorporated in 
the Communications Act of 1934, the source of the FCC's rule-making 
authority, which states that the Commission may only make such regula- 
tions as are "not inconsistent with law. "52 
The Commission argued that the regulations are not inconsistent 
with law, but merely implement the policies of the Civil Rights Act 
through more stringent standards for the broadcast ind~stry.~3 Indeed, 
other FCC regulations do differ horn the Civil Rights Act in some re- 
s p e c t ~ . ~ ~  But the case law clearly establishes that administrative agencies 
may not impair congressional policies by proscribing conduct which 
Congress by statute has allowed. For example, in FCC v .  American 
Broadcasting Co." Congress had enacted a statute proscribing certain 
types of lotteries. The FCC, by regulation, attempted to prohibit certain 
giveaway programs which were not proscribed by the statute. The 
Supreme Court held that the FCC had "overstepped the boundaries of 
interpretation and hence [had] exceeded its rulemaking power" when 
it attempted to go beyond the ~tatute .~6 A similar situation exists in the 
instant case. Congress by statute has established a clearly defined policy 
on religious discrimination, but the FCC is attempting to prohibit con- 
duct which the amendment to the Civil Rights Act allows. 
Another case announcing the rule that administrative agencies are 
bound by congressional policies, Southern Steamship Co. v .  NLRB, 57 
was cited by Chief Judge Bazelon in his concurrence in King's Garden. 
There Congress had enacted legislation which classified any rebellion by 
seamen against their officers on board a vessel anywhere within the 
admiralty jurisdiction of the United States as a mutiny, but the NLRB in 
a fair labor practices hearing declared that a strike by seamen against 
their officers was not a mutiny. The  Supreme Court struck down this 
ruling as contradictory to the congressional policy, declaring that al- 
though an administrative agency enjoys a great deal of independence, it 
has no authority to ignore other congressional objectives and must accorn- 
modate its administrative functions with other statutes.58 
S1United States v. Symonds, 120 U.S. 46 (1887). 
5247 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1970). 
53498 F.2d at 58 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
54For example, the Commission's equal employment regulations apply to all broadcasters 
regardless of size, while the Civil Rights Act only applies to employers having more than 15 
employees. See King's Garden, Inc., 38 F.C.C.2d 339,343 (1972). 
55347 U.S. 284 (1954). 
561d. at 296. 
5'316 US .  31 (1942). 
581d. at 47. Although Southern Steamship differs from King's Garden in that the former 
case involved an agency decision excusing conduct which Congress had declared illegal, in- 
stead of an agency declaring conduct illegal which Congress had excused, the principle that 
204 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1975: 
In a case similar to King's Garden, Station W C  BS- T V,59 the Commis- 
sion recognized that FCC regulations could not contravene statutory 
policies. There the Commission held that its cigarette advertising regu- 
lations promulgated under the authority of the Communications Act 
did not contradict the federal policies embodied in the Cigarette Label- 
ing and Advertising Act. But the Commission, in dictum, did recognize 
that it could not go beyond those federal policies and enforce stricter 
regulations that would require equal time for anticigarette advertising. 
I t  acknowledged that stricter regulations would "be inconsistent with 
congressional direction in this field" and that its "action, therefore must 
be tailored so as to carry out the above congressional purpose."60 As 
in Station WCBS- T V, the Commission recognized its obligation to 
stay within the bounds prescribed by the Cigarette Advertising Act, it 
should recognize its obligation to adhere to the policies embodied in the 
Civil Rights Act in the instant case. 
3. Prior reliance by the FCC upon the Civil Rights Act. In formu- 
lating and applying its nondiscrimination regulations, the Commission, 
until the 1972 amendment, has relied heavily on the provisions of the 
Civil Rights Act and the policies implicit therein.61 This express re- 
liance upon the Civil Rights Act implies that, in formulating its nondis- 
crimination regulations, the Commission was attempting to follow the 
policies of that Act. Similarly, when that Act was amended, the FCC, in 
furtherance of this practice of aligning its policies on civil rights with 
those of Congress, should have amended its regulations or at least set 
forth reasons why it should depart from its prior efforts to stay in step 
administrative agencies are bound by congressional policies is well illustrated. See also City of 
Pittsburgh v. FPC, 237 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1956). 
598 F.C.C.2d 381 (1967), aff'd sub nom. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), 
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). 
60Zd. at 382. 
61See text accompanying note 14 supra. In Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees to 
Show Nondiscrimination in Their Employment Practices, 13 F.C.C.2d 766, 769 (1968), the 
Commission explicitly acknowledged the Civil Rights Act as delineating the national policy 
against discrimination and expressed its intention of enforcing it: 
When these two considerations are taken together - the National policy against discrimi- 
nation and the nature of broadcasting - we simply do not see how the Commission could 
make the public interest finding as to a broadcast applicant who is deliberately pursuing 
or preparing to pursue a policy of discrimination-of violating the National policy. 
Similarly, in the initial ruling in the King's Garden matter, the Commission stated: 
In keeping with the exemptions you cite from the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Commis- 
sion believes that those persons hired to espouse a particular religious philosophy over the 
air should be exempt from the nondiscrimination rules. But also in keeping with the very 
limited nature of the exemptions afforded by the 1964 Act, the Commission does not see 
any reason for a broad interpretation that would permit discrimination in the employ- 
ment of persons whose work is not connected with the espousal of the licensee's religious 
views. 
Trygve J. Anderson, 34 F.C.C.2d 937,938 (1972) (emphasis added). 
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with Congress. Yet no attempt has been made to demonstrate why the 
nature of the broadcast industry makes stricter provisions necessary, or 
why the "public interest" mandate of the Communications Act requires 
nondiscrimination in employment at the expense of free exercise of 
religion. 
Furthermore, the court erred in reasoning that the Commission was 
justified in retaining its stricter regulations, which conflict with the 1972 
amendment, because the amendment might be unconstitutional. Every 
congressional enactment is presumed constitutional until declared other- 
wise by a court of competent jurisdiction and an administrative agency 
must follow a statute until it is struck down.62 
B. The FCC Regulations Impinge upon Free Exercise 
The court of appeals also held that the Commission's nondiscrimina- 
tion regulations adequately protected the rights guaranteed by the free 
exercise clause by allowing religious discrimination in employment 
where the position to be filled is connected with espousal of religion.63 
There are, however, several ways the regulations impinge on a religious 
broadcaster's rights under the first amendment's free exercise provision. 
1. The right to broadcast. The extent of the rights which religious 
broadcasters may claim under the free exercise clause has never been 
clearly defined, but the court's argument that broadcasters have "no con- 
stitutional right to convert a licensed communications franchise into a 
church" because such a franchise is a "temporary privilege9'64 is clearly 
inadequate. For at least a decade courts have rejected the right-privilege 
distinction in construing first amendment cases.65 In Banzhaf v .  FCC 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia specifically rejected 
this distinction: 
First Amendment complaints against FCC regulation of content are not 
adequately answered by mere recitation of the technically imposed 
necessity for some regulation of broadcasting and the conclusory proposi- 
tions that "the public owns the airwaves" a$ that a broadcast license is 
a "revocable privilege." It may well be that some venerable FCC policies 
cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny in the light of contemporary 
understanding of the First Amendment.66 
62Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 392-93 (1895). 
63F0r the FCC regulations to be valid under the free exercise clause, they either must not 
interfere with a legitimate religious belief or practice, or must be in furtherance of a state 
interest of sufficient magnitude to override the religious interests. See text accompanying 
notes 20-23 supra. 
64498 F.2d at 60. 
65See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
66405 F.2d 1082, 1100 (footnote omitted). See Robinson, T h e  FCC and the First Amend- 
ment: Obseruations on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulations, 52 M I N N .  L. REV. 67, 
152 (1967). 
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Similarly, the Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner stated that " [i] t 
is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression 
may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit 
or privilege.''7 Thus, the court does not solve this constitutional issue by 
categorizing the holding of a broadcast license as a privilege. The FCC, 
in conditioning the "privilege" of holding a broadcast license by restrict- 
ing the hiring practices of the religious organization which operates the 
radio station, is interfering with the free exercise of religion.@ 
2. The  right to maintain religious nature. The FCC nondiscrim- 
ination regulations would also force King's Garden to abandon its 
essentially religious nature69 as a condition for obtaining a broadcast 
license. The Commission has interpreted the regulations to allow 
religious discrimination only as to persons "who, as to content or on-the- 
air presentation, are connected with the espousal of the licensee's re- 
ligious views. "70 Under this interpretation, announcers who broadcast 
musical or other programs which are not strictly espousing religious 
views must be hired without regard to their religious attitudes. No 
executive, secretarial, technical, sales, or other personnel could be ques- 
tioned as to their beliefs. In short, King's Garden would be turned into 
a completely secular organization so far as its broadcasting activities are 
concerned, excepting only those who are hired specifically in connection 
with the espousal of religious views. 
The Supreme Court, however, has held that no person can be forced in 
this manner to choose between pursuing religion and enjoying a state 
privilege or benefit. The leading case on this point is Sherbert v.  
Ve~ner.~'  There a Seventh-Day Adventist was denied unemployment 
compensation because she refused to accept employment which involved 
working on Saturday, the day recognized as the Sabbath by her faith. 
The Court held that the denial of unemployment compensation forced 
her to choose between adhering to her religion and forfeiting benefits on 
the one hand, or abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order 
to accept work on the other. "Governmental imposition of such a choice 
puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would 
a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship," and is thus 
uncon~titutional.~~ The situation in the instant case is similar to Sher- 
67374 U.S. at 404 (1963) (footnote omitted). 
68A discussion of the other FCC regulations to which a religious organization must adhere 
is beyond the scope of this case note. However, the nondiscrimination regulations can be 
distinguished from other FCC regulations because of the direct interference with free exercise 
of religion that results from the disallowance of religious discrimination. 
69For a discussion of King's Garden's religious nature in relation to its broadcasting 
activities, see text accompanying notes 76-79 infra. 
70National Religious Broadcasters, Inc., 27 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 875,877 (1973). 
71374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
72Zd. at 404. 
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bert in that the Commission's regulations force King's Garden to choose 
between maintaining its religious nature and holding a broadcast 
license. 73 
3. T h e  right to disseminate religious ideas. The FCC, by forcing 
King's Garden to abandon its essentially religious nature, also thwarts 
King's Garden's efforts to "share Christ world-wide."74 This is a clear 
interference with its constitutional right to promulgate its religious 
ideas." While King's Garden would still be able to engage in its mis- 
sionary effort to the extent of sponsoring programs directly expressing 
religious views, it also has a right, as the court of appeals recognized, to 
give a sectarian tone or perspective to its pr0gramming.~6 Such indirect 
expression of religious ideals, which is as essential to the espousal of a 
religious philosophy as the direct discussion of religious doctrine, would 
not be possible without religious discrimination in employment. All 
announcers, although not involved directly in the espousal of doctrine, 
create the personality of the radio station by their style of speaking, their 
taste in program selection, and even by the manner in which they present 
and comment on current affairs. All other personnel, while not involved 
in speaking over the air, contribute to the atmosphere and attitude of the 
station, which is ultimately reflected in its broadcasts. Indeed, the 
presence of a large proportion of "nonbelievers" working in the station 
would discourage and inhibit the religious personnel from exercising 
their beliefs, and may completely discourage such persons from working 
for the station. Thus, the court's decision will make it impossible to pre- 
serve the spiritual atmosphere that King's Garden desires to maintain in 
the station and reflect in its broadcasting.77 
73It should be pointed out that King's Garden is not being forced to give up its religious 
nature in its entirety, but only so far as related to broadcasting. However, in Sherbert, the 
appellant was only forced to abandon her religion so far as it related to Saturday worship. 
See text accompanying notes 87-89 infra. 
74Petitioner's Brief at 4 states, "King's Garden operates these radio stations as part of its 
mission to 'share Christ world wide,' providing programming to fill the definite need of 
citizens in the area it serves for religious and inspirational programming." A detailed descrip- 
tion of King's Garden's purpose is in the Record at 8-16. 
75For the proposition that promulgation of religious ideas is a constitutionally protected 
activity, see Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 
U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v. ~enns~lvania ,  3 19 U.S. 105 (1943). 
I believe that nothing enjoys a higher estate in our society than the right.. . to practice 
and proclaim one's religious convictions. 
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141,149 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring). 
76498 F.2d at 60. 
77Petitioner's Brief at 27-28, citing the trial records, states that: 
King's Garden's staff is comparable in many respects to a religious congregation in that it 
is a group of persons who come together out of a shared religious belief and who carry on 
various helpful activities as an expression of their religious belief. . . . For example, King's 
Garden's staff conducts regular religious meetings. 
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In addition, all employees of the station are representatives of King's 
Garden to the public and all contribute in this manner to the public's 
impression of the King's Garden philo~ophy.~g In this sense each em- 
ployee is involved in the espousal of religious views through example, 
and a requirement that nonbelievers be hired is an unconstitutional 
burden on the dissemination of King's Garden's religious beliefs.79 
4.  The  right to be free from government definition of religion. 
The FCC regulations, which allow discrimination only where a person is 
"hired to espouse a particular religious philosophy over the air, raise 
the additional problem of defining "espousal of religion." There is sub- 
stantial authority for the proposition that the very existence of discre- 
tionary power to define what is and what is not religious activity violates 
the free exercise clause.81 For example, in Cantwell u. Connecticutg2 the 
Supreme Court examined a statute which prohibited the solicitation of 
money for religious causes without first obtaining a license. Under the 
statute a state official was given authority to deny a license whenever he 
determined that the cause was not religious. The Court, in striking down 
this discretionary licensing system as "a previous restraint upon the free 
exercise of religion," stated: 
[t] o condition the solicitation of aid for the perpetuation of religious 
views or systems upon a license, the grant of which rests in the determina- 
tion by state authority as to what is a religious cause, is to lay a forbidden 
burden upon the exercise of liberty protected by the Constitution.83 
Similarly, in the instant case the Commission conditions the applicability 
78Petitioner's Reply Brief at 21 draws this analogy: 
Comparison might be made to a religious leader who proposed to hold a public meeting, 
and in connection therewith chooses to hire ushers on the condition that they must share 
his religious beliefs. There would be ample justification for this, although it is perhaps a 
"nodreligiousW job, since the ushers in all their actions would be witnessing to the philos- 
ophy the religious leader sought to convey. 
79The application of the regulations to King's Garden could have been challenged on this 
ground, for the Commission has found no espousal of religion in an activity which King's 
Garden feels is a significant expression of its sectarian viewpoint. However, the attack was 
only on the facial validity of the regulations, and the court of appeals did not regard the 
question of application as properly before it. 
B0Trygve J. Anderson, 34 F.C.C.2d 938 (1972); See also King's Garden, Inc., 38 F.C.C.2d 
339 (1972). 
8 1 
I I] t is no business of courts to say that what is a religious practice or activity for one group 
is not religion under the protection of the First Amendment. 
Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953). See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
82310 U.S. 296 (1940). This case was actually decided on the broader ground of freedom of 
expression, but is often cited in support of the narrower ground of freedom of religious expres- 
sion. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461-62 (1971). 
83Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940). See Love11 v. City of Struthers, 303 U.S. 
44 (1938);  martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). 
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of its nondiscrimination regulations upon a discretionary determination 
of what constitutes "religious espousal." By forcing the religious organi- 
zation to bear the burden of establishing that its hiring practices are con- 
nected with the espousal of religious views, the Commission places a "for- 
bidden burden upon the exercise of liberty. " 
Also, the term "espousal of religion" has serious vagueness problems. 
The Supreme Court has reasoned that, because first amendment free- 
doms must be given "breathing space" to insure that their exercise will 
not be chilled, government may regulate in the area only with "narrow 
specificity. "84 The Commission's regulations are not narrowly specific. 
No definable standards sufficient to give notice to the licensee or to be 
reviewed by a court have been produced. Thus the regulation must be 
regarded as unconstitutionally vague. 
5. The right to be free from regulation of internal affairs. The 
final basis upon which the Commission's regulations could be found 
unconstitutional is that they constitute an impermissible intrusion by 
the government into the internal affairs of a religious sect. For over a 
century the Supreme Court has held that matters of church government 
and administration are beyond the purview of civil authorities.85 This 
position was recently affirmed by the Fifth Circuit in McClure v.  Salua- 
tion Armyg6 where a female minister, who received a smaller salary and 
fewer benefits than male ministers, claimed the protection of the Civil 
Rights Act provisions on equal employment. The court, explicitly 
limiting its holding to the church-minister relationship, held that the 
equal employment provisions of the Civil Rights Act could not be 
applied to religious organizations in the hiring of clergy. 
Admittedly there is a difference between hiring a minister and hiring 
employees for a radio station; the former is much more central to the 
sect's hierarchy. But the difference is one of degree, not of kind. Where 
broadcasting activities are an essential part of the sect's missionary effort 
for the promulgation of its religious beliefs, as was claimed in the instant 
case, the operation of the radio station does come within the scope of 
church administration and government and should be fiee from govern- 
ment interference. 
84NAACP v. Button, 37 1 U.S. 415,433 (1 963). 
The court in Banrhaf stated: 
Especially with First Amentment issues lurking in the near background, the "public in- 
terest" is too vague a criterion for administrative action unless it is narrowed by definable 
standards. 
Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082,1096 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (footnote omitted). 
85Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). See also Presbyterian Church v. Mary 
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kreshik v. St. 
Nicholas Cathedral, 363 US.  190 (1960); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); 
Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1920). 
s6460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972). 
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6. T h e  significance of King's Garden's free exercise claims. Argu- 
ably, the right to discriminate in employment on the basis of religion is 
not significant enough to warrant constitutional protection when bal- 
anced against other governmental interests. In Sherberts7 the right to 
observe the Sabbath on Saturday was a fundamental element of the 
petitioner's religion, and in Yodef18 the Court found that the right of 
parents to keep their children from attending public schools was essential 
to the perpetuation of the Amish way of life. The right to discriminate 
does not occupy such a fundamental position. However, the rights to 
maintain one's religion without giving up a state benefit, to disseminate 
religious ideas, to be free from governmental definition of religion, and 
to be free from the regulation of internal religious affairs are fundamen- 
tal to religion.89 These free exercise claims must be balanced against the 
interests of the state in enforcing the FCC nondiscrimination regula- 
tions," and, as the Supreme Court held in Yoder, only those state 
interests "of the highest order and those not otherwise served" will take 
precedence over free exercise claims.91 
The Commission cannot claim that it has an interest in promoting the 
national policy of equal employment opportunity, for it has been shown 
that the regulations conflict with the national policy contained in the 
Civil Rights The only other state interest that could be asserted 
by the Commission would be that the "public interest" mandate of the 
Communications Act requires stricter prohibitions on religious discrimi- 
nation because of the peculiar nature of the broadcast industry. Argu- 
ably, the fact that airwaves are a limited resource requires that the gov- 
ernment closely regulate broadcasting so as to best meet the needs of the 
public. It is reasonable to require that those holding licenses meet the 
needs of the public audience, and discrimination in employment could 
impair a radio station's ability to meet those needs. If this is accepted as 
a legitimate state interest, it must be balanced against the interest of the 
religious broadcaster in maintaining the religious nature of the organiza- 
tion. 
However, the public interest argument cuts both ways, for a failure to 
allow religious discrimination will impair the radio station's ability to 
meet the spiritual and inspirational needs of the public audience. 
Furthermore, no showing has been made that religious discrimination 
does impair the station's ability to meet the public needs. It must be 
-- , 
87374 U.S. 398 (1963). See text accompanying note 72 supra. 
88406 U.S. 205 (1972). See note 24 supra. 
89See text accompanying notes 64-86 supra. 
gosee text accompanying notes 18-23 supra. 
g1406 U.S. at 2 15. See text accompanying notes 22-23 supra. 
92See text accompanying notes 41-50 supra. 
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remembered that the presumption favors the religious interests,93 and 
unless the Commission can demonstrate some overriding state interest, 
the free exercise claims must prevail. 
Consumer Credit -TRUTH IN LENDING ACT - CREDITOR DEFINED AND 
DAMAGES AND RESCISSION JOINTLY AWARDED -Eby v.  Reb Realty, Inc., 
495 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1974). 
In October, 1969, Betty Eby purchased a residential dwelling from 
Reb Realty, Inc., for $16,700. T o  finance the transaction, Eby assumed 
a Veteran's Administration mortgage and executed a second mortgage in 
favor of Reb Realty. Eby made subsequent payments on the first mort- 
gage, but ultimately defaulted on both mortgages, whereupon Reb 
Realty properly reentered and took possession of the property. Eby sued 
in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona for rescis- 
sion and damages based on Reb Realty's admitted nondisclosure of credit 
terms and rescission rights at the time of sale as required by the Truth in 
Lending Act (the Act).' Reb Realty argued that it was not a "creditor" 
within the meaning of the Act and thus not subject to its provisions. Al- 
ternatively, Reb Realty contended that Eby must elect her remedies in 
that she was not entitled to both rescission and damages. The district 
court granted summary judgment in Eby 's favor, awarding both rescis- 
sion and damages, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.2 
The purpose of the Truth in Lending Act is to enhance economic 
stabilization and strengthen competition among those engaged in the 
extension of consumer credit. This purpose is accomplished by disclo- 
sure of certain credit terms to those who use such credit.3 Among the 
matters required to be disclosed are the annual percentage rate of in- 
terest, the total amount financed, the amount of periodic payments, and 
93See text accompanying note 23 supra. 
'15 U.S.C. $8 1601-65 (1970). For a general discussion of the Truth in Lending Act and 
related matters see e.g., J. ABRAHAM, TRUTH IN F ~ A L  ESTATE LENDING (1970); Aldridge, Truth- 
in-Lending in Real Estate Transactions, 48 N. CAR. L. REV. 427 (1970); Boyd, The Federal 
Consumer Credit Protection Act - A Consumer Perspective, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 171 (1969); 
Griffith, Truth-in-lending and Real Estate Transactions: Some Aspects, 2 OHIO N.L. REV. 1 
(1974); McLean, The Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 24 Bus. LAW. 199 (1968); 
Smyer, A Review of Significant Legislation and Case Law Concerning Consumer Credit, 6 ST. 
MARY'S L. J.  37 (1974); Warren & Larmore, Truth in Lending: Problems of Coverage, 24 
STAN. L. Fhv. 793 (1972); Note, Recent Developments in Truth in Lending Class Actions and 
Proposed Alternatives, 27 STAN. L. REV. 10 1 (1974). 
2Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d 646 (1974). The district court opinion is not officially 
reported. 
315 U.S.C. $ 1601 (1970). 
